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FOREWORD
If a post-Kyoto climate agreement fails to act on 
avoiding tropical deforestation, the achievement of 
overall climate change goals will become virtually 
impossible. The lives and livelihoods of millions of 
people will be put at risk, and the eventual economic 
cost of combating climate change will be far higher 
than it needs to be. 
For these reasons, the next agreement must create 
meaningful incentives to remunerate forest nations 
for the valuable climate services they provide to 
the world.
Important progress has been made over the past year 
by those working on REDD. But to make REDD a 
success three over-arching challenges remain. 
First, the REDD framework must provide incentives 
for all rainforest countries – if any significant group 
of countries is left out, then deforestation will move to 
those jurisdictions, and we will have failed to avoid 
greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation.
Second, these incentives must be at the scale required 
to solve the problem – if they are insufficient in 
value, they will not out-compete the other legitimate 
economic activities which drive deforestation.
Third, the citizens of forest countries – especially 
those who depend on the forest for livelihoods – must 
be active participants in framing a solution. In the 
same way as there is no solution to climate change 
without forestry, there is no solution to deforestation 
without the support of forest populations. Thanks to 
the work of many within the REDD community and 
elsewhere, there is a path to resolving the remaining 
scientific, economic and methodological issues. What 
is urgently required now is political will and effective 
action to design and implement national-scale 
solutions to meet the challenges. 
I welcome the publication of The Little REDD Book, 
and hope that it will help to move the forestry debate 
forward - from talking about the role of forests in 
combating climate change to acting with the urgency 
and clarity that the people of our planet require.
HIS EXCELLENCY BHARRAT JAGDEO
President of Guyana
November, 2008
10 11
CONTENTS
UNDERSTANDING REDD
 Forests: Why are they Important? 
 REDD: A Solution to the Problem
THE FRAMEWORK
 A framework for understanding the proposals
PROPOSALS 
 Guide to the proposals
 Governmental Proposals
 Non-governmental Proposals
HOW DO THEY COMPARE?
 Scope
 Reference Level
 Distribution
 Financing
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
 What else is being done?
 What are the challenges?
 The road to Copenhagen
ANNEXES
 Bibliography
 Glossary of terms
WHY THIS GUIDE IS NEEDED
The IPCC estimate of emissions from tropical deforestation in the 1990s 
was 1.6 billion tonnes of carbon per year equating to 20% of global carbon 
emissions. To create a mechanism that addresses this problem, many 
differing proposals to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation 
(REDD) have been put forward to the UNFCCC, which has resulted in some 
confusion. This non-partisan guide to the proposals is intended to accelerate 
understanding.
The Little REDD Book has been compiled by the GCP with the support of a 
wide range of contributors from around the world including many proposal 
authors. The Prince’s Rainforests Project has kindly provided its analysis 
of the proposals, which is at the heart of this guide. It shows how they have 
developed over time, either directly or indirectly building on what has come 
before. Most importantly, it demonstrates how much common ground there 
is between proposals - that for every point of difference there are many 
points of agreement, and that a menu of commonly held principles and 
approaches is emerging.
Agreement on REDD is within reach. The spread of new technologies such 
as satellite monitoring is overcoming some long-standing technical barriers. 
Collaboration by scientists, economists and policy makers at the UNFCCC, 
IPCC and other forums, is helping to clarify outstanding methodological 
issues. Money for capacity building and pilot projects has started to flow. 
The imperative now is for the international community to continue working 
collaboratively and with renewed urgency towards achieving political 
consensus at Copenhagen. It is our hope that this publication – and its 
online counterpart www.littleREDDbook.org – can help build understanding 
as the countdown to COP 15 begins in earnest. 
Andrew W. Mitchell
Founder & Director
Global Canopy Programme
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FORESTS: WHY ARE THEY IMPORTANT?
COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE
Tropical forests cover about 15% of the world’s land surface1 and contain 
about 25% of the carbon in the terrestrial biosphere2. But they are being 
rapidly degraded and deforested resulting in the emission of heat-trapping 
carbon dioxide to the atmosphere. Roughly 13 million hectares – an area 
the size of Nicaragua – are converted to other land uses each year1. This loss 
accounts for a fifth of global carbon emissions, making land cover change 
the second largest contributor to global warming3 (see Figure 1). Forests 
therefore play a vital role in any initiative to combat climate change.
A HOME TO LOCAL COMMUNITIES
Forest resources directly support the livelihoods of 90% of the 1.2 billion 
people living in extreme poverty and are home to nearly 90% of the world's 
terrestrial biodiversity4. Local communities depend on forests as a source 
of fuel, food, medicines and shelter. The loss of forests jeopardises poverty 
alleviation. Indigenous and forest-dependent peoples are stewards of their 
forests, providing the rest of humanity with vital ecosystem services (ES). 
Climate change will hit the poorest hardest and so reducing deforestation 
will help build their resilience to climate impacts. 
MORE THAN JUST CARBON
At local to global scales, forests provide essential ecosystem services beyond 
carbon storage – such as watershed protection, water flow regulation, 
nutrient recycling, rainfall generation and disease regulation. Old growth 
forests also soak up carbon dioxide from the atmosphere – offsetting 
anthropogenic emissions. Protecting tropical forests has a double-cooling 
effect, by reducing carbon emissions and maintaining high levels of 
evaporation from the canopy². 
THE CAUSES OF DEFORESTATION
The causes of deforestation are multiple and complex and vary from country 
to country. Local pressures arise from communities using forests to provide 
sources of food, fuel and farmland. Poverty and population pressure can 
lead inexorably to the loss of forest cover, trapping people in perpetual 
poverty. Whilst millions of people still cut down trees to make a living for 
their families, a major cause of deforestation is now large-scale agriculture 
driven by consumer demand. In recent decades deforestation has shifted 
from a largely state-initiated to an enterprise-driven process. The drivers 
of the demand for agricultural land vary globally. In Africa, it is primarily 
small-scale subsistence farming. In South America, it is large-scale farming 
enterprises, producing beef and soya for export markets. In South East 
Asia, the driver is somewhere between the two, with palm oil, coffee and 
timber the main products. Demand for timber also drives deforestation and 
therefore contributes to land-use change emissions5.
Figure 1. Regions of deforestation in recent decades
Source: Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
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REDD: A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM
WHAT IS REDD?
The basic idea behind Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD) is simple: Countries that are willing and able to 
reduce emissions from deforestation should be financially compensated 
for doing so6. Previous approaches to curb global deforestation have so far 
been unsuccessful, however, and REDD provides a new framework to allow 
deforesting countries to break this historic trend.
WHAT ARE THE OBJECTIVES OF REDD?
REDD is primarily about emissions reductions. The Bali Action Plan decided 
at the Conference of the Parties (COP) at its thirteenth session7 states that 
a comprehensive approach to mitigate climate change should include:
“Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to 
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in 
developing countries”
But, a future REDD mechanism has the potential to deliver much more. 
REDD could simultaneously address climate change and rural poverty, 
while conserving biodiversity and sustaining vital ecosystem services8.
Although these benefits are real and important considerations, the crucial 
question is to what extent the inclusion of development and conservation 
objectives will either promote the overall success of a future REDD 
framework or complicate and therefore possibly hamper the ongoing 
process of REDD negotiations.
THE STORY SO FAR...
A fundamental milestone was achieved at COP 11 in Montreal in 2005 
when Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica supported by eight other Parties 
proposed a mechanism for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in 
Developing Countries. The proposal received wide support from Parties 
and the COP established a contact group and thereafter began a two year 
process to explore options for REDD. This decision resulted in a wide 
range of Parties and observers over this period submitting proposals and 
recommendations to the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technical Advice 
(SBSTA) to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from deforestation and 
degradation. We are now at the stage where we have a number of proposals 
on the table. Under the Bali Action Plan, if REDD is to be included in a 
post-2012 framework, a decision about what a REDD mechanism will look 
like and what it will include needs to be agreed by COP15 in Copenhagen 
in December, 2009. Reaching a consensus on this issue is of paramount 
importance for a global deal on climate change9.
HOW DOES THE LITTLE REDD BOOK HELP?
The task at hand is to have meaningful and informed debates about the 
nature and implications of the proposals on t he table. 
The Little REDD Book draws upon recent work undertaken by The 
Prince’s Rainforests Project to analyse thirty-three governmental and 
non-governmental proposals submitted to the UNFCCC. Twenty of 
these submissions are by Parties to the Convention and thirteen by non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) (see the inside front cover of this book 
for reference). 
The aim of the Little REDD Book is to help forest stakeholders to understand 
and compare current and future proposals in a consistent way in order to 
promote a consensus on how to reduce emissions from deforestation and 
degradation. To do this the Little REDD Book introduces a framework 
which resolves REDD mechanisms into four distinct modules.
These modules can be thought of as independent building blocks that can 
be arranged in a ‘mix and match’ approach: taking the most desirable 
option from each module to create an effective, efficient, and equitable 
REDD proposal which maximises the potential benefits and minimises 
the perverse outcomes.
The Little REDD Book uses this framework to assess each of the proposals 
individually to allow clear comparisons to be drawn between the different 
REDD mechanisms. The individual proposals are then analysed jointly to 
show convergence and divergence in an effort to add clarity to the overall 
picture.
To help stakeholders understand the various proposals quickly and simply, 
key elements of the proposals have been presented graphically throughout 
this document. This visual language is introduced on page 27 and is also 
available on the inside back cover for quick reference.
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THE BUILDING BLOCKS
The diagram opposite presents a new framework for understanding REDD 
proposals. The framework comprises four basic building blocks as follows:
 
 • Scope: What is being delivered?
 
 • Reference Level: How is it being measured?
 
 • Distribution: Where/to whom does the money go?
 • Financing: Where does the money come from?
The overall effectiveness, efficiency and equity of a proposal is determined 
by its scope, reference level, and financing and distribution mechanisms, 
as shown in Figure 2.
It is helpful to view REDD proposals in this way because it allows us to 
understand the elements of individual proposals. It also shows us the 
distribution and evolution of ideas of the combined proposals and enables 
us to see areas where there are high levels of convergence or divergence.
MIX AND MATCH OPTIONS
Each of the four modules has a series of options that have emerged from the 
different proposals. More detail on the options encompassed within each 
module is given in the following pages. 
Some options potentially impose constraints on others. When viewing the 
proposals as a group, however, there are a number of different ‘mix and 
match’ options; for example, the decision to include deforestation and 
degradation (REDD) or just deforestation (RED) can, broadly speaking, be 
addressed separately from the question of whether to use a fund or a market.
A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE PROPOSALS Figure 2. Building blocks of a REDD proposal.
IMPACTS
Environmentally effective?
Economically efficient?
Equitably distributed?
Politically feasible?
REFERENCE 
LEVEL
How is it measured?
Over what period?
Across what scale?
FINANCING
Where does the money 
come from?
Multiple mechanisms?
DISTRIBUTION
Where / to whom does 
the money go?
What assets will be 
rewarded?
At what scale?
SCOPE
What is eligible?
Which activities?
Which carbon pools? 
Which countries?
To provide a quick reference to the different modules of the framework, the 
colours for the four modules shown above are used throughout this guide, 
green will always signify scope, blue: reference levels, purple: distribution 
and orange: financing mechanisms. A small icon will also be displayed in the 
corner of the page if a specific module in the framework is being discussed.
The framework introduced here, and the analysis behind 'How do they compare' have been developed by 
The Prince's Rainforests Project. For further information email Anna Creed: anna.creed@royal.gsx.gov.uk 
or visit: www.princesrainforestsproject.org/redd
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SCOPE
The first step in understanding REDD proposals is to quantify what is 
included. The scope refers to the activities, carbon pools and countries that 
are considered eligible for generating emissions reductions under REDD.
OPTIONS
Activities: Reducing emissions from deforestation (RED), Reducing 
emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) or enhancement 
of carbon stocks (REDD+).
The choice of scope will have an impact on the scale, relative cost and 
mitigation potential of a REDD mechanism. It will also play an important 
role in the political feasibility of an agreement and the ability of developing 
countries to measure, report and verify the options considered within scope 
in a proposal. In addition the countries that might benefit under REDD is 
also influenced by the agreed scope (see Box 1).
S
R D F REFERENCE LEVEL
A REDD mechanism must specify how emissions reductions (ERs) are being 
measured. The reference level defines the reference period and scale against 
which the activities within scope are measured.
OPTIONS
Scale: Sub-national, National, Global 
Reference period: Historic baseline, Current (structural), Projected 
baseline
Reference levels define the business as usual scenario over a predefined scale 
and can therefore be used to determine the additionality of a given activity.
Although the choice of reference level greatly impacts the types of country 
that generate ERs it need not necessarily influence which countries benefit 
from those ERs. The distribution or allocation of benefits to actors other 
than those generating the reductions is discussed in the distribution module. 
Reference levels, however, are often conflated with an adjustment factor or 
a negotiable element to account for differing country circumstances.
It is worth noting that the science of forestry carbon accounting, and 
moreover the assessment of business as usual practices within forests is still 
imprecise10 and as such both historic and projected baselines have a large 
element of uncertainty. Much work has been done and continues to be done, 
however, to improve technical and methodological know-how in this area. 
Global Observation of Forest and Land Cover Dynamics (GOFC-GOLD) 
and the IPCC are recognised within the intergovernmental and scientific 
communities as sources of high quality scientific knowledge that 
is increasing certainty in the establishment of reference levels and 
monitoring methods.
S
R D F
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DISTRIBUTION
The scope and reference level determine how many emissions reductions 
will be generated. Of equal importance is how the benefits of those 
reductions will be allocated. The majority of proposals advocate incentives 
or compensation directly in line with a Party’s own actions. Other proposals 
suggest that some of these benefits should be redistributed to Parties other 
than those generating the emissions reductions through a distribution 
mechanism.
OPTIONS
Asset: Emissions, Carbon Stock, Opportunity Costs
Scale: Sub-national, National, Global
The choice of how to distribute benefits has the potential to greatly influence 
the impact across countries (see Box 1). Some proposals, for equity reasons 
or to address socioeconomic factors, have chosen a distribution mechanism 
which allocates funds to historically low emitters who may emit at some 
point into the future. Other proposals, to avoid international leakage, have 
suggested that a proportion of funds generated through REDD should be 
distributed to countries with currently low rates of deforestation but high 
forest cover. The argument goes that if these countries are not rewarded to 
protect their current stocks there will be a perverse incentive to chop down 
their forests for more profitable ventures.
The choice of methodology for distributing benefits can be scientific or 
negotiated. Furthermore, proposals which allocate benefits in line with 
generated reductions will be regarded in this book as having no distribution 
mechanism. As discussed, proposals sometimes conflate reference levels 
with distribution mechanisms. Where this is the case this book will separate 
these two elements to allow for a simpler comparison.
S
R D F FINANCING
The final step in defining the framework of a REDD proposal is where 
the money comes from.
OPTIONS
Source: Direct-Market, Hybrid / Market-linked, Voluntary Fund
Activities for REDD can be financed though a voluntary fund, a direct-
market or a hybrid / market-linked mechanism. A voluntary fund could 
operate at the national (i.e. uni- or multilateral) or international scale. 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is an example of a funding 
mechanism. In general, however, non-Annex I Parties call for new and 
additional contributions from developed countries. It is important to note 
that emissions reductions generated through a fund cannot be used for 
compliance in carbon markets. In a market-based mechanism REDD credits 
would be traded alongside existing certified emissions reductions (CERs), 
and could be used by companies to meet emissions targets in their national 
cap-and-trade systems. A hybrid / market-linked mechanism generates 
finances through either an auction process, or by establishing a dual-market 
in which REDD credits are linked to but are not fungible with existing CERs. 
Norway’s proposal to auction Assigned Amount Units (AAUs), the Center for 
Clean Air Policy’s “Dual Markets” approach and Greenpeace’s TDERM are 
all examples of market-linked mechanisms11.
Each of these approaches has its strengths and weaknesses, however a 
growing consensus is emerging that a combination of these approaches will 
be needed to match the different stages of development and differing needs 
of tropical rainforest nations11.
S
R D F
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BOX 1: WHO CAN BENEFIT?
Fonseca and colleagues12 have devised a matrix to show that developing 
countries fall into four basic categories or quadrants based on their forest 
cover and recent deforestation rate (see Table 1). 
These quadrants are important within the context of the REDD debate as 
not all countries will benefit equally under any proposed REDD mechanism 
depending on the choice of options within the basic building blocks of the 
framework.
Table 1: A matrix to split countries by their forest cover and historical rate 
of deforestation12.
Depending on the choice of scope, reference level, distribution, and to an 
extent funding mechanism of a given proposal, some countries stand to 
benefit more than others under REDD. For example, countries in Quadrants 
I and III with historically high deforestation rates will, broadly speaking, 
stand to gain more from proposals that use a historical baseline, than say 
a projected baseline. Countries in Quadrants III and IV with high forest 
cover will also benefit more from proposals that have an explicit distribution 
mechanism based on carbon stocks. Finally, countries in Quadrant II with 
low forest cover and low rates of deforestation will find it difficult to benefit 
under REDD unless enhancement activities are included in the scope of 
the mechanism.
HIGH 
DEFORESTATION 
RATE 
( > 0.22%/yr)
LOW 
DEFORESTATION 
RATE 
( < 0.22%/yr)
Quadrant I
e.g. Guatemala, Thailand, 
Madagascar
No. of Countries: 44
Forest area: 28%
Forest carbon total: 22%
Deforestation annual 48%
Quadrant II
Dominican Republic, 
Angola, Vietnam
No. of Countries:15
Forest area: 20%
Forest carbon total: 12%
Deforestation annual 1%
LOW FOREST COVER ( < 50%) HIGH FOREST COVER ( > 50%)
Quadrant III
e.g. Papua New Guinea, 
Brazil, Congo (DR)
No. of Countries: 10
Forest area: 39%
Forest carbon total: 48%
Deforestation annual 47%
Quadrant IV
e.g. Suriname, Belize, Gabon,
No. of Countries: 11
Forest area: 13%
Forest carbon total: 18%
Deforestation annual 3%
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30 31
GUIDE TO THE PROPOSALS
The following pages present a guide to the thirty-three proposals currently 
being considered using the analytical framework introduced above. Each 
proposal has been represented graphically using the icons shown overleaf. 
These icons represent the main options from the analytical framework, and 
have been grouped into their respective modules.
The icons will be presented at the top of each proposal in an ‘icon bar’ (see 
Figure 4 above). Not all proposals aim to define all of the modules of the 
framework. Therefore to simplify matters, all icons in the icon bar will 
be grey by default and only the options that are explicitly proposed in the 
submissions will be highlighted in colour. The colour will correspond to the 
module of the framework in which the icon is grouped. 
Figure 4. Icon bar
The example in Figure 4 above indicates that the scope of this hypothetical 
proposal includes deforestation and degradation, the reference level is 
historic, the proposal hasn't specified an explicit distribution mechanism 
and the financing is through a hybrid / market-linked fund.
SCOPE
DISTRIBUTION
Figure 5. Key to Icons
SCALE
Degradation EnhancementDeforestation Historic
Emissions Direct Market
Current
Carbon Stock Hybrid / Market-linked
Projected
Opportunity 
Costs
Voluntary Fund
REFERENCE LEVEL
FINANCING
National Sub-national Global
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
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GOVERNMENTAL
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34 35
AUSTRALIA
UNFCCC Document Code*
FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5, FCCC/SBSTA/
2007/MISC.2, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.14/
Add.1, FCCC/SBSTA/2008/MISC.4/Add.2 
Date
June 2008
SUMMARY
Australia states that the overarching principles, rather than the individual 
mechanisms, will determine the successful outcome of a future REDD 
framework and propose five key principles to be considered. Among these 
are the need for a clearly defined scope with robust monitoring and reporting 
methodologies, a national sectoral baseline to address national-level leakage, 
and a consistent treatment of emissions across the AFOLU sector. 
REDD will be most effectively addressed through a market-based 
mechanism, and Parties should try also to maximise co-benefits including 
biodiversity conservation, air, soil and water pollution reduction and the 
improvement of rights of indigenous and forest dependent peoples. 
Australia believes that Parties and relevant organisations should progress 
demonstration activities as a priority and is working in partnership with 
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea on practical activities to reduce emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation in the context of SFM.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
BRAZIL
UNFCCC Document Code*
FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5, FCCC/SBSTA/
2007/MISC.2, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.14
Date 
February 2007
SUMMARY
Brazil proposes the establishment of a voluntary fund into which developed 
countries provide new financial resources additional to existing funding 
activities. Developing countries are entitled to ex-post financial incentives 
from the arrangement after they demonstrate, in a transparent and credible 
manner, that they have reduced their emissions from deforestation.
Incentives should be based on a comparison between the rate of emissions 
from deforestation over a past time period and a reference emissions rate 
(RER). Decreases in emissions will be credited and increases in emissions 
will be converted into a debit from future financial incentives. The price per 
tonne of carbon for incentives will be negotiable and reviewed periodically.
Accounting will be at the national level and incentives will be distributed in 
the same ratio as the emissions reductions each country has achieved. The 
RER is the average rate of deforestation over the previous 10 year period 
starting from the time of implementation within the UNFCCC, and will be 
recalculated every 3 years as the average of the last three years emissions 
from deforestation (if rates have fallen below the RER).
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
* UNFCCC document codes 
can be searched on the 
UNFCCC website at: http://
unfccc.int/documentation/
documents/advanced_search/
items/3594.php using the 
“Document Symbol or Call 
Number” text field
* UNFCCC document codes 
can be searched on the 
UNFCCC website at: http://
unfccc.int/documentation/
documents/advanced_search/
items/3594.php using the 
“Document Symbol or Call 
Number” text field
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CANADA
UNFCCC Document Code*
FCCC/SBSTA/2008/MISC.4
Date
April 2008
SUMMARY
Canada recognises the importance of the IPCC and GOFC-GOLD and 
recommends the IPCC to produce a report on methodological guidance 
for a REDD mechanism. 
The indicative guidance provided in the Annex to Decision 2/CP.13 states 
that reductions in emissions or increases resulting from a demonstration 
activity should be based on historical emissions, taking into account national 
circumstances. Further guidance will be necessary from SBSTA to identify 
factors that must be considered in the determination of reference emissions 
levels, e.g. national circumstances.
Canada believes that the inability to meet methodological requirements 
related to forest degradation should not result in the complete exclusion 
of a Party from an incentive to reduce emissions from deforestation, 
provided that the said Party meets the methodological requirements related 
to deforestation.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
CHILE
UNFCCC Document Code*
FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5, FCCC/SBSTA/
2007/MISC.2, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.14
Date 
August 2007
SUMMARY
This proposal uses the “Nested Approach” proposed by CATIE, summarised 
under non-governmental proposals on page 53.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
* UNFCCC document codes 
can be searched on the 
UNFCCC website at: http://
unfccc.int/documentation/
documents/advanced_search/
items/3594.php using the 
“Document Symbol or Call 
Number” text field
* UNFCCC document codes 
can be searched on the 
UNFCCC website at: http://
unfccc.int/documentation/
documents/advanced_search/
items/3594.php using the 
“Document Symbol or Call 
Number” text field
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COALITION FOR RAINFOREST NATIONS (CfRN)
UNFCCC Document Code* 
FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5, FCCC/SBSTA/
2007/MISC.2, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.14, 
FCCC/SBSTA/2008/MISC.4/Add.1,
Unpublished material
Date
August 2008
SUMMARY
CfRN recognises three distinct categories of national development which 
require differing approaches and sources of funding. Category I, the 
readiness phase, would use voluntary funding to build capacity in developing 
countries. It could build on existing platforms such as the FCPF or the 
UN-REDD Initiative. Category II, scaling-up, would still be voluntarily 
funded, and could incorporate a trial market phase. It aims to encourage and 
expand a range of national, sub-national, local and project-level activities. 
Category III, future markets, calls for a series of policy measures that must 
be considered to establish an effective mechanism for REDD. These include, 
crediting for early action to ensure that current emissions reductions from 
deforestation are creditable post 2012, an adjustment mechanism taking 
into consideration national circumstances as well as environmental, social 
and economic factors, and a market mechanism which is fully fungible with 
AAUs but complementary and additional to the CDM.
A reference emissions rate (RER) should be determined by assessing rates 
of deforestation over a historical Reference Period no shorter than five 
years. Incentives would be allocated by calculating the estimated reduced 
emissions, using IPCC guidelines, over an agreed upon past time period, 
evaluated against the RER plus a development adjustment (DA) factor.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
COLOMBIA
UNFCCC Document Code* 
FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.14, FCCC/SBSTA/
2008/MISC.4
Date
April 2008
SUMMARY
Colombia, as other Latin-American countries, proposes some basic elements 
of a future REDD mechanism. These include Incentives for early action 
under the UNFCCC framework, a market mechanism involving the private 
sector to mobilize the necessary investment flows into developing countries, 
wider participation and deeper GHG emission reduction commitments by 
Annex I countries. Incentives should be complemented by instruments to 
allow countries to build capacities and enhance the availability and quality 
of data.
The proposed mechanism should be consistent with the principles of the 
carbon market and rely on the technical and institutional infrastructure 
already in place. Colombia believes that each Party should be able to choose 
from either a sub-national to national reference level and suggests that 
leakage issues could be managed at the project-level through an approved 
methodology whereby the displaced emissions are deducted from the 
project credits.
Reference levels could use either an extrapolation of past trends into the 
future, prevailing technology or practice, or logical arguments made by 
activity participants based on observed trends. Tradable and fully fungible 
emission reduction credits would be issued against the aforementioned 
reference levels.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
* UNFCCC document codes 
can be searched on the 
UNFCCC website at: http://
unfccc.int/documentation/
documents/advanced_search/
items/3594.php using the 
“Document Symbol or Call 
Number” text field
* UNFCCC document codes 
can be searched on the 
UNFCCC website at: http://
unfccc.int/documentation/
documents/advanced_search/
items/3594.php using the 
“Document Symbol or Call 
Number” text field
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CENTRAL AFRICAN FOREST COMMISSION (COMIFAC)
UNFCCC Document Code* 
FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5, FCCC/SBSTA/
2007/MISC.2, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.14, 
FCCC/SBSTA/2008/MISC.4
Date
March 2007
SUMMARY
To achieve real and measurable benefits for the climate, COMIFAC states 
that policy approaches and positive incentives should be based on a basket 
approach designed to address the differing dynamics of the forest sector 
within developing countries, linked with substantial emissions reduction 
commitments in developed countries. Within this context, three voluntary 
funding options, similar to the proposal by CfRN, are available for three 
distinct deforestation phases. Firstly, an enabling fund would be needed 
to build capacity with reference scenarios and policy measures to reduce 
deforestation. Secondly, a stabilization fund would be used in countries 
with currently low rates of deforestation to protect and maintain carbon 
stocks; funding could come from a share of proceeds from REDD credits 
combined with additional funds provided by Annex I countries through 
ODA or taxation. Thirdly, a REDD mechanism, whereby positive incentives 
are awarded for emissions reductions below a reference scenario (RS) could 
provide positive incentives for REDD. The RS would be a combination of 
a historical reference emissions rate (RER) and a development adjustment 
factor (DAF).
Given the diversity of national circumstances, it is essential to be flexible 
in selecting approaches and relevant action levels for consideration; both 
national and sub-national approaches are compatible and relevant in Congo 
Basin countries.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
COSTA RICA
UNFCCC Document Code* 
FCCC/CP/2005/MISC.1, FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5, 
FCCC/SBSTA/2008/MISC.4
Date
April 2008
SUMMARY
Costa Rica proposes a market based mechanism based on solid technical 
and methodological procedures that allows Non-Annex I Parties, who 
voluntarily elect to reduce their emissions from deforestation, to be financially 
compensated by Annex I Parties on the basis of their performance.
To avoid the creation of any perverse incentives that may deteriorate ongoing 
programmes or planned efforts, Parties should support early action of 
developing countries by ensuring that any emissions reductions obtained 
during the period from 1990 to the start of any future agreement on REDD 
can be used to assist in achieving future compliance.
Reference emission levels should be estimated using historical data for 
changes in forest cover area, and IPCC procedures to estimate associated 
carbon stocks and carbon stock changes. Developing countries with early 
policy approaches that have led to reduced deforestation rates should be 
permitted to adjust their reference emission levels to a date appropriate 
to national circumstances.
On an annual basis, a proportion of the projected emission reductions should 
be kept in reserve, and could be drawn from during periods of unpredictably, 
thereby providing continuity of funding to support ongoing activities.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
* UNFCCC document codes 
can be searched on the 
UNFCCC website at: http://
unfccc.int/documentation/
documents/advanced_search/
items/3594.php using the 
“Document Symbol or Call 
Number” text field
* UNFCCC document codes 
can be searched on the 
UNFCCC website at: http://
unfccc.int/documentation/
documents/advanced_search/
items/3594.php using the 
“Document Symbol or Call 
Number” text field
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EUROPEAN UNION (EU)
UNFCCC Document Code*
FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5, FCCC/SBSTA/
2007/MISC.2, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.14, 
FCCC/SBSTA/2008/MISC.4, Unpublished Material
Date
July 2008
SUMMARY
The EU proposes that policies should focus on positive incentives to reduce 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and that additional 
actions on conservation, SFM and enhancement of forest carbon stocks 
could complement measures for REDD.
The EU favours an approach that bases incentives on agreed national 
reference emissions levels, which should be ambitious, yet realistically 
achievable, taking into account national circumstances including existing 
policies and initiatives, historical data, current trends and developments 
in land use. The agreed level would be negotiated and revised periodically. 
The EU recognises that sub-national approaches may be appropriate under 
some national circumstances, as a step towards the development of national 
approaches, reference levels and estimates, however, national approaches 
are essential to avoiding the risk of leakage within the national boundary.
The EU recognises that public financing is currently not sufficient and not 
sustainably available, and therefore recognises the need to further assess all 
financing options, in particular with respect to scale and sustainability they 
might provide, and notes that a well designed market-linked approach can 
contribute to long-term action.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
INDIA
UNFCCC Document Code* 
FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.2, FCCC/SBSTA/
2007/MISC.14/Add.2, FCCC/SBSTA/2008/MISC.4
Date
March 2008 
SUMMARY
India highlights that Brazil’s submission for compensated reduction unfairly 
favours countries with high deforestation rates, and therefore proposes a 
mechanism of “Compensated Conservation” that also rewards countries 
for maintaining and increasing their forests as a result of conservation. As 
such, India would support a common methodology that i) assessed changes 
in carbon stocks and GHG emissions due to conservation and sustainable 
management of forest, and ii) reductions in emissions from deforestation 
and degradation.
The UNFCCC could create three different financial instruments for the 
range of different actions to be implemented by the countries according to 
their national circumstances. These might include a Reducing Deforestation 
Fund, a Stabilization Fund, and a Forest Carbon Conservation Fund. India, 
like other Parties, also considers an Enabling Fund to support capacity 
building and pilot activities related to REDD activities for developing/least 
developed countries.
To enable robust reporting of changes in forest cover, a national baseline is 
recommended, to prevent double accounting and leakage. CDM A/R project 
activity, will also be entered as a debit in the national inventory for REDD 
accounting.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
* UNFCCC document codes 
can be searched on the 
UNFCCC website at: http://
unfccc.int/documentation/
documents/advanced_search/
items/3594.php using the 
“Document Symbol or Call 
Number” text field
* UNFCCC document codes 
can be searched on the 
UNFCCC website at: http://
unfccc.int/documentation/
documents/advanced_search/
items/3594.php using the 
“Document Symbol or Call 
Number” text field
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INDONESIA
UNFCCC Document Code*
FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5, FCCC/SBSTA/
2007/MISC.2/Add.1, 
FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.14/Add.1, FCCC/
SBSTA/2008/MISC.4
Date
March 2008 
SUMMARY
Indonesia states that the adoption of a single definition for deforestation 
is essential to ensure the fairness of providing incentive for developing 
nations. Voluntary actions eligible for compensation should include 
enrichment planting in secondary forests, emissions reductions through 
avoided conversion of forest, emissions reductions through combating 
illegal logging and fires, and conserving carbon through forest conservation.
Reference levels for generating credits would be two-fold. The reference 
level for unplanned activities is derived from a national historic baseline 
over a predetermined period. Unimplemented planned activities would use 
a baseline set according to the carbon stock existing at the start of the REDD 
commitment.
Indonesia, like CfRN, defines three distinct phases of activity which would 
require three separate financial resources. Readiness activities would 
leverage ODA through bilateral and/or multilateral channels. A transition 
phase would use both ODA and voluntary based funding mechanisms and 
transition to a pre-2012 market. A post 2012 agreement would use a basket 
approach including domestic, regional or international emissions markets, 
accompanied by deeper targets for Annex I Parties.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
JAPAN
UNFCCC Document Code* 
FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/
MISC.2, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.14, FCCC/SBSTA/
2008/MISC.4, Unpublished Material
Date
August 2008 
SUMMARY
Japan recognizes it is important to reduce and furthermore reverse the loss 
of worldwide forest coverage through SFM, including protection, restoration, 
afforestation and reforestation, and increased efforts to prevent forest 
degradation. Due to the varied and essential functions of forests, policies 
and measures to address deforestation and degradation should focus on not 
only carbon flux but also promotion of SFM and conservation of biodiversity.
The reference level would be set based on historical change of forest 
resources. More specifically it would be established by monitoring present 
forest resources making use of both satellite images and ground researches 
in forests against an assessment of forest resources in the past with 
previous satellite images and/or forest inventory. In countries where the 
rate of deforestation and degradation is low but is foreseen to rise, future 
socioeconomic trends could also be reflected when setting the reference level. 
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
* UNFCCC document codes 
can be searched on the 
UNFCCC website at: http://
unfccc.int/documentation/
documents/advanced_search/
items/3594.php using the 
“Document Symbol or Call 
Number” text field
* UNFCCC document codes 
can be searched on the 
UNFCCC website at: http://
unfccc.int/documentation/
documents/advanced_search/
items/3594.php using the 
“Document Symbol or Call 
Number” text field
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MALAYSIA
UNFCCC Document Code*
FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5, FCCC/SBSTA/
2007/MISC.2
Date
February 2007 
SUMMARY
Malaysia believes that policy approaches for REDD should be based on 
both measures taken as well as opportunity costs foregone. Developing 
countries that have retained large tracts of natural forests will be under 
greater pressure to convert forest to other land uses and incentives for these 
countries should be maximized to ensure that the remaining forest is not 
deforested. Both total protection and SFM practices should be considered 
as positive practices to avoid deforestation.
Malaysia believes that new and additional funds will have to be set aside for 
developing countries to assist in building technical and institutional capacity 
to implement effective measures for REDD. Positive incentives should be 
voluntary, flexible, and offer a range of incentives that would be applicable 
to the wide variety of forestry environments, management regimes and 
socio-economic and development conditions of developing countries. 
Malaysia is concerned that countries anticipating a mechanism which 
rewards reductions in emissions over a historical baseline will give rise to 
a perverse incentive to increase timber harvests in the years prior to the 
onset of the first commitment period. Malaysia can see the advantages of 
a national based approach for the REDD mechanism as it would simplify 
reporting and validation. Project-based approaches, however, should also 
be considered.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
MEXICO
UNFCCC Document Code*
FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.2, FCCC/SBSTA/2008/
MISC.4/Add.3, Unpublished Material
Date
August 2008 
SUMMARY
In order to increase the cost-effectiveness of REDD activities, it will be 
fundamental to account for their participation in the carbon market. Mexico 
considers that discussions on how to appropriately integrate REDD activities 
within this market should be conducted in the context of the Second Review 
of the Kyoto Protocol. Funds will play a critical role for activities such as 
capacity building, conservation and SFM, which need non-return funds in 
order to be deployed.
Reference emissions levels, at all scales of implementation, should be based 
on historical data on GHG emissions and should take into account national 
circumstances. Mexico strongly encourages a national accounting system to 
facilitate reporting and to avoid double-counting of emission reductions or 
removals. The implementation of activities at the national or sub-national 
level will be determined by each country on a voluntary basis, as their 
sovereign right, taking into account their specific national circumstances 
and requirements. Sub-national approaches for some countries, however, 
might constitute a step towards the development of national approaches.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
* UNFCCC document codes 
can be searched on the 
UNFCCC website at: http://
unfccc.int/documentation/
documents/advanced_search/
items/3594.php using the 
“Document Symbol or Call 
Number” text field
* UNFCCC document codes 
can be searched on the 
UNFCCC website at: http://
unfccc.int/documentation/
documents/advanced_search/
items/3594.php using the 
“Document Symbol or Call 
Number” text field
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NEW ZEALAND
UNFCCC Document Code* 
FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/
MISC.2, Unpublished Material
Date
August 2008 
SUMMARY
Any REDD mechanism must provide developing countries with adequate 
financial resources to compensate them for the economic benefits they forgo 
by reducing deforestation and degradation.
To provide the primary financial resources to address REDD, a market-
based approach is likely to be more durable and economically efficient than 
a fund-based approach. Both approaches, however, have their benefits and 
drawbacks and New Zealand is open to exploring both options.
A national-based mechanism (be it market-or fund-based) is likely to be 
significantly superior to a project-based mechanism, primarily because 
it is better at addressing intra-country leakage. Some form of fund-based 
approach may be appropriate as an initial step to aid countries’ development 
of a national-level approach, even if a market-based approach at the national 
level is ultimately agreed as the primary funding mechanism.
Any mechanism should have maximum potential for global coverage, as this 
is the best way to address issues of international leakage. The mechanism 
should not apply arbitrary adjustments to financial incentives to ‘correct’ 
for possible international leakage.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
NORWAY
UNFCCC Document Code*
FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5, Unpublished Material
Date
September 2007
SUMMARY
Norway believes that REDD should be additional to, and not a substitute for, 
deep cuts in developed countries’ emissions. As well as promoting reductions 
in emissions a REDD mechanism should promote SFM, contribute to the 
protection of biodiversity and secure the rights and involvement of local 
communities and indigenous peoples.
Norway believes in principle that reference levels should be based on 
historical emission data, but recognises that for many countries with low 
rates of deforestation and degradation such historical rates would not give 
a sufficiently strong incentive. A future REDD regime should operate at 
the national level in order to reduce tahe risk of within country leakage. 
Transitional solutions may be needed to help countries in developing 
national approaches. Such transitional solutions must address the risk of 
intra-national leakage, by for example limiting credits from sub-national 
REDD activities to fund-based approaches, without an offset mechanism.
Norway believes a combination of market- and fund-based mechanisms 
is needed. Markets could be useful in mobilizing resources from the 
private sector, but could be less effective for countries with low rates of 
deforestation. Further, a market based mechanism would not be relevant 
for capacity-building. On the other hand, a fund that solely relies on aid 
donations would not necessarily be sustainable in the long run.
Norway has proposed more recently that an auctioning of emissions 
allowances at the international level could be used as a source of finance 
for REDD. A 2% levy on AAUs could generate an income between $15 and 
25 billion per year.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
* UNFCCC document codes 
can be searched on the 
UNFCCC website at: http://
unfccc.int/documentation/
documents/advanced_search/
items/3594.php using the 
“Document Symbol or Call 
Number” text field
* UNFCCC document codes 
can be searched on the 
UNFCCC website at: http://
unfccc.int/documentation/
documents/advanced_search/
items/3594.php using the 
“Document Symbol or Call 
Number” text field
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PARAGUAY*
UNFCCC Document Code*
FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.14, FCCC/SBSTA/
2008/MISC.4
Date
April 2007
SUMMARY
This proposal uses the “Nested Approach” proposed by CATIE, summarised 
under non-governmental proposals on page 53.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
TUVALU
UNFCCC Document Code*
FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.2/Add.1, FCCC/SBSTA/
2007/MISC.14, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.14/Add.3
Date
November 2007
SUMMARY
Tuvalu suggests, firstly, that for the purpose of REDD discussions 
appropriate definitions of deforestation and degradation need to be 
developed that minimise potential perverse outcomes. Conservation of 
existing carbon stocks should be explored outside the REDD mechanism 
as there are no emissions being traded.
Tuvalu highlights three market approaches for REDD, but demonstrates 
that there are inherent complications with these approaches which need 
to be properly addressed before decisions can be made to adopt these 
mechanisms. These include the risk of leakage with project-level baselines, 
flooding of carbon markets, and measurement difficulties. Tuvalu suggest as 
possible solutions to these issues: the use of a national baseline for leakage, 
dual markets, increased Annex I targets, or discounted REDD credits to 
avoid market devaluation, and wide availability of remote sensing and 
ground sensing methodologies in developing countries to allow consistent 
measuring. Tuvalu also proposes that non-market sources of funding should 
also be explored and could be used to support capacity building and early 
action on REDD.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
* on Behalf of Argentina, Honduras, Mexico, Panama and Peru
* UNFCCC document codes 
can be searched on the 
UNFCCC website at: http://
unfccc.int/documentation/
documents/advanced_search/
items/3594.php using the 
“Document Symbol or Call 
Number” text field
* UNFCCC document codes 
can be searched on the 
UNFCCC website at: http://
unfccc.int/documentation/
documents/advanced_search/
items/3594.php using the 
“Document Symbol or Call 
Number” text field
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USA
UNFCCC Document Code*
FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/
MISC.14, FCCC/SBSTA/2008/MISC.4
Date
March 2008
SUMMARY
The United States is of the view that efforts to mitigate deforestation 
should occur in the broader context of sustainable forest management and 
sustainable development. While deforestation is a major source of emissions, 
emissions also occur from land degradation and opportunities to increase 
carbon storage on managed lands are consistent with broader sustainable 
forest management objectives. The United States has supported increasing 
the priority of conserving forests and reducing emissions from deforestation 
in relevant existing bodies.
Both national and project-level activities have strengths and weaknesses 
and need further exploration.  Project-based approaches are useful for 
targeting specific concerns and ensuring that there is a causal link between 
an action and a response. Displacement of emissions, or leakage, is a key 
methodological issue associated with REDD at the project/sub-national 
scale, but can also occur with national level accounting. National approaches 
are broader in scope and can capture shifts of emissions within a country's 
borders.  It is more difficult, however, with national approaches to measure 
the impacts of policy changes in national emission trends.  Both national and 
project-based approaches for this work program should be consistent with 
the IPCC Good Practice Guidance for LULUCF.
Definitional issues should be examined as part of the technical work 
program; a clear definition or set of definitions for forest degradation 
within the REDD context are particularly necessary.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
* UNFCCC document codes 
can be searched on the 
UNFCCC website at: http://
unfccc.int/documentation/
documents/advanced_search/
items/3594.php using the 
“Document Symbol or Call 
Number” text field
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NON-
GOVERNMENTAL
PROPOSALS
56 57
CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK (CAN)
Website 
www.climatenetwork.org
Date
February 2008
SUMMARY
The proposal developed by CAN suggests auctioning all or part of the Annex 
I Assigned Amount Units (AAUs), which are currently allocated for free, to 
generate funds for REDD activities. There are a range of options that should 
be explored in this field including:
 
 • On the international level, AAUs would not be allocated for   
 free to countries, but rather would be determined by a central   
 auction  under an agreed, and tight, overall cap. Part of the 
 revenues generated would be put in a separate global fund in   
 support of adaptation, technology and REDD
 • On the international level, part of the Assigned Amount would not  
 be allocated for free to countries but rather taken out and put in a  
 separate global fund to be monetized and allocated to adaptation,  
 technology and REDD
 
 • On the national level, permits would be auctioned and part of that  
 revenue would be placed in a national fund coordinated with other  
 national funds or an international fund for adaptation, technology  
 and REDD
Auctioning could be a significant funding source. For example, assuming 
a price of $30 to $40/tonne, each one percent of Annex I AAUs set aside 
would generate $3.75bn/year. 
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
TROPICAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND 
HIGHER EDUCATION CENTER (CATIE)
“NESTED APPROACH” 
Authors
Lucio Pedroni, Michael Dutschke, Manuel Estrada Porrua, Axel Michaelowa, 
Andrea García Guerrero, and Walter Oyhantçabal
Website 
www.catie.ac.cr
Date
October 2008
SUMMARY
The “Nested Approach” proposed by CATIE and the German Emissions 
Trading Association BVEK aims to address project-level investment risk 
within national-level accounting mechanisms. Under a national-level 
crediting system, individual projects, which generate real emissions 
reductions below an approved baseline methodology, would not be credited 
unless the overall country emissions reductions were below the national 
baseline.
To address this outcome, the Nested Approach uses an accounting 
mechanism at both the national- and project-level. Countries with 
emissions below a negotiated target would receive credits that can then be 
redistributed to local actors. Sub-national entities are also direct recipients 
of credits, regardless of national performance, thus creating a direct 
opportunity for private sector investment.
After its initial release the Nested Approach has since been supported by 
a number of organizations and Latin American countries (see Chile, and 
Paraguay on behalf of Argentina, Honduras, Mexico, Panama and Peru).
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
58 59
CENTER FOR CLEAN AIR POLICY (CCAP)
“DUAL MARKETS APPROACH”
Authors
Matthew Ogonowski, Ned Helme, Diana Movius, Jake Schmidt
Website 
www.ccap.org
Date
August 2007
SUMMARY
The so-called “dual markets approach” developed by the Center for Clean Air 
Policy (CCAP) proposes the creation of a new carbon market that would be 
separate from the post-2012 carbon market and would trade solely in REDD 
credits. Emissions reductions within this market could be used by Annex I 
Parties to achieve national targets but credits would not be fungible between 
the two markets. 
The rationale behind creating an independent market is to separate the 
impacts and risks of integrating a REDD market with the post-2012 regime. 
Concerns exist that development of a single market would risk flooding with 
an excess supply of REDD units and raise concerns related to volatility and 
permanence, leading to disruptions in the post-2012 carbon market. The 
dual markets approach allows time for a REDD program to develop before 
any market linking.
The COP would decide the maximum amount of credits derived from REDD 
activities that could be used to meet national targets. Annex I Parties would 
specify at the outset how many, and from which developing countries, offsets 
will be purchased, thereby providing a minimum level of demand for REDD.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT LAW (CISDL)
“CARBON STOCK APPROACH”
Authors
Steve Prior, Charlotte Streck, Robert O’Sullivan
Website 
www.cisdl.org
Date
February 2007
SUMMARY
The “carbon stock approach” aims to overcome a number of difficulties 
associated with proposals that rely on a national baseline that requires 
central oversight and coordination to establish emissions reductions. 
CISDL and GPPI highlight three issues with baseline methodologies and 
traditional government to government cooperation: Weak and poorly 
enforced forest administration, failure to capture private sector investment; 
and failure to generate ex-ante financial incentives. To address these 
concerns Prior et al. propose a Carbon Stock Mechanism that awards ex-ante 
allowances based on the carbon stock of a country. A reserve of protected 
stock is established over part of the national forest area and projects that 
commit to permanently protecting threatened stock outside of the reserve 
receive further tradable credits. Credits are issued over time to create 
incentives for long-term protection. The area of reserved forest is calculated 
using a future projected baseline that estimates the expected forest cover 
at a negotiable future date in the future.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
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CENTRE FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
ON THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT (CSERGE)
“COMBINED INCENTIVES 1”
Authors
Bernardo Strassburg, Kerry Turner, Brendan Fisher, Roberto Schaeffer, 
Andrew Lovett
Website 
www.uea.ac.uk/env/cserge/
Date
January 2008
SUMMARY
The proposal by CSERGE offers a compensation mechanism with “combined 
incentives” to reduce emissions in developing countries. Strassburg et al. 
highlight two issues with existing mechanisms. Firstly, project- or national-
level mechanisms have been unsuccessful in the past due to national or 
international leakage respectively. Secondly, additional incentives should 
be provided to countries that have been conserving their forests in the recent 
past (quadrant IV countries from Table 1).
To address these issues, CSERGE propose that credits should be generated 
relative to a global baseline, thus eliminating international leakage. 
Secondly, credits should be distributed based on individual country 
performance against both past emissions and a global average emissions 
rate. These “combined incentives” allow funds to be allocated to both 
previously high emitters and countries with currently low deforestation 
rates. The proportion of funds going to each of these activities is adjustable 
and could be decided by the COP.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND (EDF)
“COMPENSATED REDUCTIONS”
Authors
Marcio Santilli, Paulo Moutinho, Stephan Schwartzman, Daniel Nepstad, 
Lisa Curran, Carlos Nobre
Website 
www.edf.org
Date
December 2006
SUMMARY
The “compensated reductions” approach by EDF and the Amazon Institute 
for Environmental Research (IPAM) is one of the earlier proposals to 
address reducing emissions from deforestation and is intended as a broad 
vision for the purpose of stimulating debate. In that sense, it should be 
viewed as more of an umbrella category rather than as a detailed proposal 
for negotiations. Santilli et al. use a simple concept: any (non-Annex I) 
country that reduces national deforestation levels below a predetermined 
baseline would be eligible for compensation through a global carbon market.
Emissions reductions would be relative to a historical average level of 
deforestation, although reference levels could be tailored to different 
national circumstances; for example, HFLD countries could receive credits 
if reference levels were set above their recent level of deforestation. Santilli 
et al. also suggest revising reference levels downward over time to achieve 
zero deforestation.
Compensation would be allocated ex-post, and would be measured using a 
combination of remote sensing, ground surveys and/or forest inventories. 
The mechanism would also operate at the national level to avoid within 
country leakage, and to assure additionality, and permanence.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
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GREENPEACE
“TDERM”
Authors
Bill Hare, Kirsten Macey
Website 
www.greenpeace.org
Date
December 2007
SUMMARY
The Tropical Deforestation Emissions Reduction Mechanism (TDERM) is 
a hybrid market-linked fund that aims to overcome several fundamental 
issues inherent in REDD mechanisms. Hare and Macey highlight 
technical issues including scale effects, leakage, and other methodological 
uncertainties, as well as market instability and social and biodiversity 
concerns.
The proposed fund would trade Tropical Deforestation Emission Reduction 
Units (TDERUs) that would not be fungible with the current CDM market. 
The price of TDERUs could be set either by auctioning or by setting a price 
linked to the price of Kyoto units. Annex I Parties would be required to 
meet a fixed part of their national targets using TDERUs. To minimise scale 
effects this volume would fall between an upper and lower percentage of 
total emissions. 
The fund would be part of a post 2012 agreement and would be responsible 
for meeting both climate and biodiversity objectives. Greenpeace advocate 
modalities and procedures for allocating funds that would ensure equity, 
effectiveness and a broad range of participation.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
HUMANE SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL (HSI)
“CARBON STORES APPROACH”
Authors
Alistair Graham, Rod Holesgrove, Nicola Beynon
Website 
www.hsi.org.au
Date
August 2008
SUMMARY
HSI propose a single framework for terrestrial carbon stores and AFOLU 
that merges LULUCF with the proposed REDD framework. To that end, 
Graham et al. recommend a flexible “carbon stores approach” that rewards 
developing countries with both high and low historical deforestation rates 
for maintaining and maximising their carbon stocks based on the extent 
to which land is maintained at, degraded below or restored to its natural 
carbon carrying capacity.
To avoid perverse outcomes, such as the clearing of primary natural forests 
to create short rotation fuel and fibre crops, Graham et al. state that any 
post-2012 agreement must adopt appropriate definitions and associated 
accounting and reporting protocols for forests, deforestation and forest 
degradation.
Funds for the new mechanism would be generated through two streams. 
HSI supports the inclusion of a REDD market mechanism in the UNFCCC 
post 2012 agreement, but also strongly encourage governments and other 
agencies to maintain and substantially increase funding independent to 
markets for the protection of carbon stores and biodiversity.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS 
ANALYSIS (IIASA)
“AVOIDING REDD HOT AIR”
Authors
Michael Obersteiner, et al.
Website 
www.iiasa.ac.at
Date
October 2008
SUMMARY
The proposal by IIASA aims to address two key requirements of any 
potential REDD mechanism; firstly the generation of measurable, reportable 
and verifiable (MRV) REDD credits, and secondly the provision of 
sustainable emissions reductions. 
To ensure MRV credits, IIASA advocate the establishment of an 
International Emission Reference Scenario Coordination Centre (IERSCC). 
The IERSCC would act as a global clearing house for harmonized data used 
in reference scenario modelling. It would be tasked with the collection, 
reporting and subsequent processing of earth observation, and deforestation 
and degradation driver information in a globally consistent manner. The 
IERSCC would also coordinate reference emission scenarios of individual 
countries against which "real" REDD efforts can be measured.
To maximise ecosystem services co-benefits, Obersteiner et al. use a Dutch 
tender auction of REDD credits. The auction can be implemented in one of 
two ways: either maximizing the ecosystem value per REDD unit or the GHG 
mitigation per fungible Annex I emission reduction unit.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IDDRI)
“COMPENSATED SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS”
Authors
P. Combes Motel, R. Pirad, J.-L. Combes
Website 
www.cerdi.org
Date
June 2008
SUMMARY
The “compensated successful efforts” methodology put forward by 
IDDRI and the Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement 
International (CERDI) aims to bypass methodological issues of baseline 
estimation used by other proposals. 
The authors highlight thematic issues in calculating emissions reductions 
that rely on an ex-ante estimation or negotiation of a counterfactual value. 
They suggest that any such methodology could result in the generation of 
“fake” credits and misallocation of financial resources that would ultimately 
undermine the efficiency of any future REDD mechanism.
The proposal instead suggests that REDD funds support a country’s 
domestic policies and measures to avoid deforestation (called “successful 
efforts”). To identify the effectiveness of these efforts the authors use an 
econometric model that explicitly takes into account ex-post structural 
drivers of deforestation, thereby using their real values during the crediting 
period. Any effects which are not a result of structural drivers are assumed 
to be a result of domestic action and if positive can be used as criteria to help 
with further financing decisions.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
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JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE (JRC)
“INCENTIVE ACCOUNTING”
Authors
Danilo Mollicone et al.
Website 
www.jrc.it
Date
March 2006
SUMMARY
The JRC propose a new accounting mechanism for REDD that awards both 
reducing deforestation in countries with high forest conversion rates, and 
maintaining low forest conversion rates in the other countries. Mollicone et 
al. point out that if a hypothetical remuneration mechanism is based solely 
on national baselines, those countries with low forest conversion rates will 
see little or no benefit in making further reductions.
Baselines under the mechanism are established using an average over an 
historical reference period between two negotiable dates. To avoid intra-
national leakage Mollicone et al. state that any baseline should be at the 
country level.
The generation of credits is determined through a country’s historical 
conversion rate relative to the global average. Mollicone et al. propose that 
countries with emissions less than half of a global average baseline are 
rewarded for maintaining their carbon stock and countries with emissions 
higher than average are rewarded for reducing emissions from forest 
conversion.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
TERRESTRIAL CARBON GROUP (TCG)
Authors
Ralph Ashton et al.
Website 
www.terrestrialcarbon.org
Date
July 2008
SUMMARY
The TCG demonstrate that all types of terrestrial carbon are essential in 
combating climate change and should therefore be included in any future 
climate change response. Initially this would include peatlands, forest and 
lands that can become secondary forest; other areas could be phased in as 
the science develops.
Under the proposal, developing countries would be allocated a “national 
terrestrial carbon budget” which they can emit over a fixed period (say 
50 years) into the future. The national budget would be defined as 
any terrestrial carbon that was not protected terrestrial carbon on a 
predetermined date; “protected” refers to carbon currently protected by 
law, or not likely to be emitted over the fixed period because of economic or 
biophysical constraints. The system therefore applies to developing nations 
with different historical and current terrestrial carbon circumstances
Credits would be allocated under the proposed system for emitting less than 
the national budget, and/or the creation of any new protected terrestrial 
carbon, thereby safeguarding against permanence. Revenue could be 
generated from a variety of market or fund-based mechanisms. The system 
rests on national terrestrial carbon accounting and monitoring, but allows 
national- and sub-national-level activities and participation by the private 
sector and civil society. 
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
68 69
THE WOODS HOLE RESEARCH CENTER (WHRC)
“STOCK-FLOW APPROACH”
Authors
Andrea Cattaneo
Website 
www.whrc.org
Date
August 2008
SUMMARY
The “stock-flow” approach by WHRC proposes a new allocation mechanism 
to address concerns in existing proposals. Cattaneo builds on the 
“compensated reduction” approach in a way that avoids the implicit penalty 
imposed on countries with a historically low rate of deforestation, and 
proposes an approach that is along the lines of the “combined incentive” 
approach, but with a stronger underlying economic rationale.
To distribute funds, the stock-flow approach uses an analogy between 
forest carbon and financial assets, paying for avoided depreciation of the 
carbon stock (REDD) and providing dividends for stock as an incentive to 
avoid leakage. The global revenue is calculated from the overall emission 
reductions - paid by Annex I countries (demand) - at the market price for 
REDD credits. The global revenue is distributed - to REDD providers in non-
Annex I countries (supply) - according to a negotiated price to be paid for 
national emission reductions. The funds arising from the price difference 
are distributed as a dividend per ton of standing carbon stock. 
A low price for suppliers of emissions reductions activities will therefore 
mean a higher dividend price for carbon stock and vice versa. Similarly 
higher prices of demand will lead to higher prices received for both 
maintaining carbon stock and reducing emissions.
SCOPE REFERENCE LEVEL DISTRIBUTION FINANCING
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HOW DO THEY 
COMPARE?
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Deforestation, Degradation 
and Enhancement (REDD+)
Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD)
Deforestation (RED)
SCOPE: 
What the proposals include
This diagram shows the proposed 
scope of the various governmental 
and non-governmental proposals.
Proposals have either chosen 
to include emissions from 
deforestation (RED), deforestation 
and degradation (REDD), or 
deforestation, degradation and 
enhancement (REDD+).
Proposals have been grouped into 
non-governmental, developed and 
developing country proposals.
*Chile and Paraguay have not been shown here as they 
essentially use the nested approach proposed by CATIE.
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There is an overwhelming consensus that a future mechanism for REDD 
should include both deforestation and forest degradation. A minority of 
proposals explicitly emphasise that carbon enhancement activities should 
be considered of equal importance as reduced emissions.
Although deforestation and degradation are the immediate priorities, 
there is widespread recognition that a future REDD mechanism could have 
a staggered approach, that phases in degradation and/or enhancement 
activities at later stages. 
The rationale behind this approach is mainly practical for reasons including: 
the political feasibility of negotiations under the UNFCCC with a simpler 
scope; and the need for developing countries to build capacity in carbon 
accounting practices.
There is agreement that only developing countries can participate in REDD, 
and participation should be on a voluntary basis only.
Most proposals make no reference to the carbon pools that might be 
included under REDD.
SCOPE: Conclusions
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS S
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The diagram opposite shows 
whether proposals specify a 
reference level at the sub-national, 
national or global scale.
Some proposals use multiple 
reference levels and are shown here 
on the line between two options.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
REFERENCE LEVEL: 
The scale of reference levels
IIASA and USA do not specify a scale for the reference level.
*Chile and Paraguay have not been shown here as they 
essentially use the nested approach proposed by CATIE.
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The following diagram shows the 
choice of reference period specified 
by the proposals.
Proposals specify either a projected, 
historic or current reference level.
The proposals by CATIE and 
Indonesia use two reference periods 
and are therefore located on the line 
between two reference periods.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
REFERENCE LEVEL: The reference 
period chosen by proposals
Projected
Current
Historic
IIASA, USA, Australia, CCAP and New Zealand do not 
specify a reference period in their proposals.
* CATIE uses two reference periods and is therefore located 
on the line between two reference periods.
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Sub-national
2005 2006
Global
National
The following diagram shows the 
evolution of the reference level 
methodology specified in non-
governmental proposals.
Some key milestones in the 
development of ideas have been 
highlighted.
Proposals that use two scales, i.e. 
both a sub-national and national 
reference level, are located on the 
line dividing two groups.
The coloured arrows denote the 
evolution of different lines of 
thinking.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
REFERENCE LEVEL: Evolution 
of thinking from 2005 – 2008
*Chile and Paraguay have not been shown here as they 
essentially use the nested approach proposed by CATIE.
EDF
JRC
2. Introduction of a 
global baseline to offer 
incentives to countries 
that have historically low 
rates of deforestation.
1. The original idea of 
“compensated reduction” 
from a national historic 
baseline. Still a valid and 
supported methodology 
and served as a starting 
point for the purpose of 
stimulating debate.
Year of 
submission
S
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4. Introduction of a national 
and sub-national baseline to 
promote early action in project 
based activities.
3. Introduction of 
protected areas 
as a precondition 
for participation 
and the use of a 
projected baseline.
CSERGE
CSERGE
The focus of these 
proposals is financing 
rather than reference 
level. The same is true 
for IIASA
6. Movement away from global 
reference level back to national 
due to concerns over feasibility of 
widespread participation in a global 
scheme. Assessment is now against 
a combination of national and global 
reference levels
Projected Current Historic
5. Global baseline used 
for the first time to 
address international 
leakage as well as 
equity and distribution 
concerns.
*CATIE
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Scale
There is a strong consensus that reference levels should be at the national 
scale. With only a few proposals supporting sub-national or global 
reference levels.
Sub-national reference levels are used for several reasons:
 • to allow developing countries who do not have the capacity to   
 create national carbon accounting mechanisms to participate at   
 some level in REDD (COMIFAC, Colombia, Malaysia);
 • to provide an incentive for both project level and national level  
 activities, as proposed in the “nested approach” (CATIE, Chile,   
 Paraguay);
 • as a transitional mechanism in which a country may start with 
 a sub-national reference level, and move to a national reference 
 level in the long term (EU, Norway, New Zealand, Mexico).
Global reference levels have been proposed to address concerns over 
international leakage (CSERGE, WHRC) and to allow for a distribution of 
benefits to historically low deforesting countries (JRC, CSERGE, WHRC).
Reference Period
There is a clear preference for national and global proposals to use reference 
levels based on historic emissions, whereas sub-national approaches may be 
better suited to a projected reference level, as proposed by CATIE.
In the end though, there may be little difference between the use of historic 
or projected reference levels; many of the proposals that use an historic 
reference period argue for the incorporation of a ‘development adjustment 
factor’ or something similar (Canada, CfRN, COMIFAC, Costa Rica, EU, 
Japan, Mexico, EDF), which effectively creates a projected reference level.
IDDRI is a unique case in this picture; instead of using either a projected or 
an historic baseline proposes to establish efforts by analysing the current 
causes of deforestation given national socioeconomic circumstances.
REFERENCE LEVEL: Conclusions
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS S
R D F CATIE is an interesting proposal as it specifies a projected, forward-
looking baseline for sub-national activities (in line with current CDM A/R 
methodologies), but uses a historic baseline for national-level activities (in 
line with the majority of proposals).
Indonesia also uses dual baselines; these are not, however, according to scale 
and both operate at the national level. National historic rates are proposed 
for unplanned emissions and a national projected rate for planned activities.
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The diagram opposite shows the 
proposals that explicitly define 
a distribution mechanism. 
The proposals that are represented 
here in transparent boxes have 
distributional implications but do 
not specify an actual distribution 
mechanism. These proposals all 
award benefits directly in proportion 
to generated emissions reductions.
Proposals that have solid boxes 
specify an explicit distribution 
mechanism. These proposals all 
allocate a proportion of benefits to 
countries other than those directly 
generating emissions reductions. 
The small icon in the corners of 
these proposals denotes which 
assets are rewarded under these 
mechanisms.
DISTRIBUTION: Proposals with 
explicit distribution mechanisms
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Projected
Current
Historic
*Chile and Paraguay have not been shown here as they 
essentially use the nested approach proposed by CATIE.
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Generally, distribution implications are simply implicit in the reference level 
methodology. Most countries don’t suggest any further redistribution of 
benefits (and New Zealand is strongly against it). 
The implication of implicit distribution mechanisms (or lack thereof) is that 
the majority of proposals reward historically high emitters and exclude low. 
Some proposals (including CfRN) make reference to the possibility of 
allocating notional reference levels (incorporating a development adjustment 
factor) to low emitting countries, which would in effect redistribute funds to 
these countries. It seems that Parties are increasingly open to this option.
Three proposals explicitly specify a distribution mechanism to redistribute 
funds to countries that would otherwise not benefit (CSERGE, JRC and 
WHRC). All three proposals use a global historic baseline to calculate 
emissions reductions and then use a variety of mechanisms to allocate a 
proportion of benefits to countries other than those generating emissions 
reductions.
COMIFAC proposes a stabilisation fund to support countries with low rates 
of deforestation that could be partly derived from a share of proceeds from 
REDD credits. 
Malaysia believes that policy approaches for REDD should be based on both 
measures taken as well as opportunity costs foregone.
DISTRIBUTION: Conclusions
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS S
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Hybrid
Fund
Market
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
FINANCING: The choice of financial 
mechanism of the proposals
The diagram opposite shows 
whether proposals choose to use 
a market, fund or hybrid/market 
linked mechanism to finance 
REDD activities.
Proposals that use two financial 
mechanisms are located on the line 
dividing two groups.
Norway is represented in three 
areas at it proposes three 
financing vehicles.
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Many proposals support both a fund and a market mechanism for different 
types of activity.
 • Funds are considered to be more appropriate for capacity building  
 and pilot activities.
 • Funds are also proposed for the conservation of standing forests.
 • Markets are often recognised as providing more consistent and   
 greater funding potential in the long term.
Several countries explicitly refer to a Basket of Approaches (CfRN, 
COMIFAC, Indonesia) that focuses on combining different sources 
of financing for different aspects of REDD on appropriate timescales.
This idea is discussed further on page 92).
Some proposals explicitly state that sub-national entities will be authorised 
to engage directly with financing systems, however the majority give no 
indication who the principle agents are, nor how money is transferred.
FINANCING: Conclusions
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS S
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WHERE DO WE 
GO FROM HERE?
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WHAT ELSE IS BEING DONE?
COLLABORATIVE MODELLING INITIATIVE ON REDD ECONOMICS
Terrestrial Carbon Group, University of East Anglia, 
Conservation International, Environmental Defense Fund, 
and Woods Hole Research Center
The “Collaborative Modelling Initiative on REDD Economics” aims to 
provide relevant economic information to support UNFCCC negotiations 
on REDD. The Initiative will build an open source data set and model to 
evaluate the carbon emission and financial implications of alternative 
approaches to providing positive economic incentives for REDD, ensuring 
comparability of results. 
Participating organizations include the Terrestrial Carbon 
Group, Conservation International, Environmental Defense Fund, 
University of East Anglia, and Woods Hole Research Center, with input 
from the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and the 
Prince's Rainforests Project. 
This group will initially evaluate five proposals from the participating 
organizations. Preliminary results will be available by the UNFCCC COP 
in Poznan in December 2008, with further results available by March 2009. 
The data and model will also be available to those interested in modelling 
and understanding the likely impacts of various proposals.
Results will compare and contrast the findings of different approaches with 
respect to the following factors:
(a) The maximum volume of carbon emissions that could be rewarded under 
each proposal (overall and on a country-by-country basis); and,
(b) The likely volume of carbon emission reductions, forests conserved, 
revenues generated, and international leakage at given carbon prices based 
on assumptions and dynamic modelling (overall and on a country-by-
country basis).
Figure 6. Forest area conserved by REDD incentives (don’t forget With and without REDD incentives)
Figure 6 shows the analytical framework of country level supply curves for 
deforestation, and shifts in these supply curves due to the implementation 
of global REDD policies and the effect of leakage. Results predict land 
clearance, reductions in emissions, and revenues by country according 
to different proposed REDD policies and different carbon prices.
The participating organizations plan to hold a side event at the Poznan COP 
to present preliminary results, and would welcome engagement from the 
wider community interested in REDD.
Contact: 
Dick Rice (Conservation International): d.rice@conservation.org
Ralph Ashton (TCG): ralph.ashton@terrestrialcarbon.org
+
Q' Q'Q'Q' Q'Q'Q' Q'Ha Ha HaHa
+ =
P'
P
Country I
REDD eligible
Country II
REDD eligible
Country II|
REDD ineligible
Tropical Total
Total extent of 
deforestation avoided
Annual market for agricultural land cleared from forest With and without REDD incentives
96 97
COMPLEMENTARY FINANCING
Union of Concerned Scientists
With many financing options emerging, the “Complementary Financing” 
approach (discussed by CfRN and the WRI, among others) focuses on 
combining different sources of financing for different aspects of REDD on 
appropriate timescales. The complementary financing approach utilizes 
three important sources of potential money for REDD: direct carbon 
market funding, market-linked funding and voluntary funding.
Figure 7. Expected Evolution of Funding Needs
|
2010
|
2020
|
2030
VOLUNTARY
MARKET-LINKED
DIRECT CARBON MARKET
In direct carbon market funding, industrialized countries purchase 
REDD credits for use as emissions allowances in their national cap-and-
trade systems, potentially thereby purchasing the right to emit more 
domestically than their caps allow, by offsetting their emissions abroad. 
Market-linked approaches generate funding by using auction revenues 
or allocated allowances for REDD, or by establishing systems in which 
REDD credits are not fungible with industrial country allowances. In market 
linked options, funding increases as cap-and-trade markets and the price 
of carbon increase, but, crucially, the REDD credits are not offsets. Finally, 
voluntary funding provided by countries or individuals is unconnected to 
their cap-and-trade markets such as official development assistance (ODA) 
or Norway's $2.6 billion commitment announced at Bali.
The complementary financing approach aims to connect these three 
financing methods with the timeframe in which it can be most useful 
towards achieving overall REDD goals (see Figure 7) and emphasizes that 
all three financing approaches are needed, and should be complementary 
to maximize their effectiveness. In the short-run, the flexibility of voluntary 
approaches presents the quickest way to build up capacity. Approaching 
2020, more funding will be needed to bolster REDD, but risks of leakage, 
non-additionality and monitoring errors constrain how much should come 
directly from a carbon market. During this time period, market-linked 
options should play a large role, which helps to avoid the risks from leakage 
and non-additionality. Finally, in the 2020s, and beyond, presuming a 
built-up capacity, a broad experience base and near-global participation, the 
direct carbon market can provide the large and continual funding needed for 
REDD.
The debate over REDD financing must address which methods meet the 
unique objectives of different time periods in building credible and long-
lasting REDD regime. Each method plays an important role, providing 
smaller or larger amounts of funding over time as the REDD process evolves. 
The complementary financing approach seeks to maximize the benefit 
of each financing option by applying them to different time periods in 
complementary ways.
Contact: 
Diana Movius: dmovius@ucsusa.org
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INTEGRATING REDD INTO THE GLOBAL CLIMATE PROTECTION REGIME 
CIFOR
CIFOR’s work on REDD focuses on a wide range of issues from technical 
methodologies to national level governance and international policy related 
to the climate negotiations. Ongoing work encompasses: 
 
 • Developing cost-efficient methods for determining REDD   
 baselines and monitoring changes in carbon stocks; 
 
 • Improving policies, institutional arrangements and reward   
 mechanisms for efficient, effective and equitable REDD schemes; and
 
 • Establishing appropriate REDD architecture, including consistent  
 policies linking local contexts to national and global regimes. 
Current projects include work on the global architecture and design of REDD 
(with ODI); learning lessons from Payments for Ecosystem Services for REDD 
(with IIED/WRI), introducing REDD into tools for capacity building on 
donor assistance to forests and climate change, work on regional mechanisms 
for REDD in Eastern and Southern Africa (with IIED and WWF), and 
investigating the potential for REDD and local people in Brazil, Ghana, Laos, 
Vietnam and southern Africa.
The work on the global architecture and design of REDD focuses on analytical 
priorities of relevance to the negotiations. These priorities were informed 
by consultations among representatives of climate negotiators, key research 
institutions, advocacy organizations, and the private sector. The key themes 
include: 
 • The implications of different scales in approaches to REDD:   
 national, sub-national and nested approaches 
 
 • The implications of different methodological approaches 
 to degradation
 
 • Linking country needs and financing sources for REDD 
 • Lessons from economic models for the role of REDD in 
 stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations 
CIFOR has also produced a book on major issues related to REDD. The 
book aims to add clarity to the debate surrounding the negotiations, and to 
help readers focus on the critical issues. Both of these streams of work aim 
to clarify what the options are and to assess their implications in term of 
effectiveness, efficiency and equity.
CIFOR is engaged in the REDD debate in several countries. For example, in 
Indonesia CIFOR has been involved in supporting the design of the national 
REDD architecture. This work covered issues such as the policy framework, 
land-use strategies, reference levels and monitoring systems. 
Contact: 
Daniel Murdiyarso: d.murdiyarso@cgiar.org
Website: 
www.cifor.cgiar.org/carbofor/projects/globalredd/introduction.htm
100 101
FOREST LAW ENFORCEMENT GOVERNANCE AND TRADE (FLEGT)
FERN
FERN's work on REDD follows on from involvement in the development and 
implementation of the EU Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade 
(FLEGT) Action Plan, presented in 2003. The Action Plan sets out a range of 
measures that aim to tackle illegal logging by improving forest governance, 
strengthening local peoples' tenure rights, developing a licensing scheme 
that assures timber has been legally produced and creating a system for 
independent monitoring of the implementation process. Over the past five 
years, FERN has been working closely with partners in Cameroon, Congo, 
Gabon, Ghana, Liberia and Malaysia to create a legally sound basis for an 
EU-FLEGT partnership agreement with these countries.
Governance and Law Enforcement
There is a growing consensus that improved forest governance, the ‘G’ in 
FLEGT, including local peoples’ tenure rights, is a pre-condition for forest 
protection and sustainable forest management. 
The second step is law enforcement, the ‘LE’ in FLEGT; without having just 
and equitable laws in place, law enforcement will often backfire. Illegal forest 
use, in most cases, is not just an outcome of poor governance and corruption 
but is an integral part of local and national political economies. Revenues 
from illegal forest exploitation can therefore keep existing political parties, 
policies and practices in operation. Hence, simple law enforcement may 
therefore increase conflict and poverty and not contribute to better forest 
management. 
For successful FLEGT agreements, it is essential to start a political dialogue 
with producer countries focused on forest sector reform, increasing 
transparency, strengthening land tenure and access rights, and reducing 
corruption. The first FLEGT agreement, signed between the EU and 
Government of Ghana in September this year, was a good example: it was 
based on a proper consultation process and has taken the first steps towards 
strengthening community rights and conserving biodiversity.
These lessons are as applicable to REDD as to FLEGT: the World Bank’s 
readiness programme for Ghana clearly shows it can and will build on the 
framework created by the EU FLEGT Programme. 
Current projects include: 
 
 • putting into practice the lessons learned from FLEGT in the design  
 of REDD programmes at the national and international level, with  
 our partners in various countries; 
 
 • strengthening networks of local and regional NGOs to allow them  
 to take part in the negotiations of forest-climate agreements; 
 
 • researching the tenure situation in countries that may engage in  
 REDD to clarify ownership rights over land, forest and carbon;
FERN is also producing a series of briefing sheets on REDD including: 
 • key principles for an effective and equitable agreement; 
 
 • REDD financial mechanisms; 
 
 • effective REDD consultation processes; 
 
 • development and implementation of World Bank's REDD plans. 
The first of these is already available on our website. 
Contact:
Saskia Ozinga: saskia@fern.org
Website: 
www.fern.org 
www.loggingoff.info
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ELIASCH REVIEW: ‘CLIMATE CHANGE: FINANCING GLOBAL FORESTS’
United Kingdom Office of Climate Change
The Eliasch Review is an independent report commissioned by the 
British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, and led by Johan Eliasch, Special 
Representative on Deforestation. It provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
financing and mechanisms needed to support sustainable management of 
forests and reduce emissions associated with deforestation. 
The Review finds that:
 
 • The international community should aim to support forest nations  
 to halve deforestation by 2020 and make the global forest sector   
 ‘carbon neutral’ by 2030 – i.e. with emissions from forest   
 loss balanced by new forest growth. 
 
 • Reducing emissions from deforestation should be fully included 
 in any post-2012 global climate deal at Copenhagen. 
 
 • National Governments should develop their own strategies to   
 combat deforestation in forest countries, including establishing   
 baselines, targets and effective governance and distribution of   
 finances.
 
 • In the long term, the forest sector should be included in global   
 carbon markets.
 
 • Public and private sector funding will be needed in the short to   
 medium term as carbon markets grow.
 
 • The international community should provide support for capacity  
 building where necessary. Total capacity building costs are   
 estimated at up to $4 billion over 5 years for 40 forest nations. 
 
Website: www.occ.gov.uk
TEEB: THE ECONOMICS OF ECOSYSTEMS AND BIODIVERSITY
German Federal Ministry for the Environment and the 
European Commission
Nature provides human society with a vast diversity of benefits such as 
food, fibres, clean water, healthy soil and carbon capture and many more. 
Though our well-being is totally dependent upon the continued flow of 
these ecosystem services (ES), they are predominantly public goods with 
no markets and no prices, so are rarely detected by our current economic 
compass. As a result, biodiversity is declining, our ecosystems are being 
continuously degraded and we, in turn, are suffering the consequences.
Taking inspiration from ideas developed in the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), aims to 
promote a better understanding of the true economic value of ES and to offer 
economic tools that take proper account of this value. The results of this 
work aim to contribute to more effective policies for biodiversity protection 
and for achieving the objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
TEEB has two phases; Phase I demonstrates the huge significance of 
ecosystems and biodiversity and the threats to human welfare if no action is 
taken to reverse current damage and losses; and Phase II will expand on this 
and show how to use this knowledge to design the right tools and policies.
PHASE I
Findings on the cost of inaction suggest that, with a “business-as-usual” 
scenario, by 2050 we will be faced with serious consequences:
 • 11% of the natural areas remaining in 2000 could be lost,   
 chiefly as a result of conversion for agriculture, the expansion 
 of infrastructure, and climate change;
 • almost 40% of the land currently under low-impact forms 
 of agriculture could be converted to intensive agricultural use,   
 with further biodiversity losses;
 • 60% of coral reefs could be lost – even by 2030 – through fishing,  
 pollution, diseases, invasive alien species and coral bleaching due to  
 climate change.
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The ultimate aim of TEEB is to provide policy makers with the tools they 
need to incorporate the true value of ES into their decisions. Key challenges 
in developing and applying suitable methodologies include ethical choices 
to be made between present and future generations and between peoples 
in different parts of the world and at different stages of development. 
Without taking these aspects into account, the Millennium Development 
Goals cannot be achieved. Some promising policies are already being tried 
out and are already working in some countries. Examples come from many 
different fields, but they convey some common messages for developing the 
economics of ecosystems and biodiversity:
 • rethink today’s subsidies to reflect tomorrow’s priorities;
 
 • reward currently unrecognized ES and make sure that the costs  
 of ecosystem damage are accounted for, by creating new markets  
 and promoting appropriate policy instruments;
 
 • share the benefits of conservation;
 
 • measure the costs and benefits of ES.
PHASE II
The economic approach in Phase II will be spatially specific and will build 
on knowledge of how ecosystems function and deliver services. Phase II 
will also examine how ecosystems and their associated services are likely to 
respond to particular policy actions. It will be essential to take account of the 
ethical issues and equity, and of the risks and uncertainty inherent in natural 
processes and human behaviour.
The fundamental requirement is to develop an economic yardstick that 
is more effective than GDP for assessing the performance of an economy. 
National accounting systems need to be more inclusive in order to measure 
the significant human welfare benefits that ecosystems and biodiversity 
provide. By no longer ignoring these benefits, such systems would help 
policy makers adopt the right measures and design appropriate financing 
mechanisms for conservation.
Website: ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/economics/
index_en.htm 
REDD BASELINE MODELING USING A NEW CLASSIFICATION 
OF COUNTRY CIRCUMSTANCES 
The Nature Conservancy, TerraCarbon
The analysis by The Nature Conservancy and TerraCarbon compares the 
quantity of credits generated by the different reference levels specified 
in seven of the current proposals for REDD (EDF, Brazil, JRC, Corridor 
Approach, WHRC, CSERGE, and TCG). The goal is to make a first 
approximation of the quantity of credits expected to be generated from 
different baseline proposals, depending upon country circumstances, using 
real data on forest carbon emissions.
This can be done with the benefit of hindsight: A hypothetical scenario is 
used in which a REDD agreement was created in year 2000, thus the actual 
“business-as-usual” baseline is known, since FAO-FRA reported emissions 
from 2000 to 2005. It is assumed that tropical countries perform equally 
during the first 5 year period of the REDD mechanism, reducing their 
emissions by 10% below the known “business-as-usual” emissions. 
Credits generated by each proposal are determined by the difference 
between emissions under the 10% REDD scenario, and the “negotiated 
baseline” emissions determined by the rules presented in each proposal 
(referencing historic forest carbon emissions FAO data from 1990 – 2000). 
The Nature Conservancy welcomes input from authors of individual 
proposals to improve the interpretation of their rules and to make 
reasonable assumptions about the negotiated outcomes associated with 
some proposals. 
Table 3. 
Characteristics 
of Country Types
HFLD
HFMD
HFHD 
 
MFMD 
 
LFLD
Highest forest cover, 
low rate of deforastion
High forest cover, 
medium rate of deforestation
High forest cover, 
high rate of deforestation
Medium forest cover,
medium rate of deforestation
Low forest cover, 
low rate of deforastion
85 - 100%
50 - 85%
50 - 95%
35 - 50%
1 - 35%
0 - 0,1%
0,04 - 0,8%
0,8 - 1,5%
0,3 - 0,8%
0 - 0,3%
Latin America
Latin America
SE Asia
Scattered
Africa
Name Description Forest Cover
Annual Rate 
Forest Loss
Dominant
Location
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In order to understand how outcomes depend upon country circumstances, 
five types of REDD countries are identified using multivariate statistical 
analysis of data on historic rates of deforestation and percent remaining 
forest from 56 tropical countries (see Table 3). These countries are 
represented geographically in Figure 8.
Future analyses will consider economic, governance, and demographic 
variables to better understand the country circumstances and deforestation 
drivers for the five types of REDD countries.
Contact:
Bronson Griscom (TNC): bgriscom@tnc.org
Other authors:
David Shoch (TerraCarbon), Bill Stanley (TNC), 
Rane Cortez (TNC).
Website: 
www.nature.org/climatechange www.terracarbon.com
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Figure 8. Geographic distribution of countries sorted into country types PINC: PROACTIVE INVESTMENT IN NATURAL CAPITAL
Global Canopy Programme
PINC is a funding framework proposed by Global Canopy Programme and 
other collaborators in the Forest Now network that specifically focuses 
on large areas of standing tropical forests, not immediately threatened by 
deforestation and which may or may not benefit from REDD. It suggests 
a mechanism to economically reward the function of large areas of intact 
forests as ‘global utilities’ providing ecosystem services that underpin food 
and energy security at local to global scales. PINC is therefore not specifically 
related to carbon emissions reduction but calls for straight-forward funding 
or investment on a per hectare basis for tropical forests, which store carbon, 
create rain, moderate weather conditions and protect biodiversity. 
As the services provided by natural ecosystems have become more 
widely recognized, Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) are growing 
in popularity as a method of funding conservation and sustainable 
development. 
Tropical forests offer multiple 
ecosystem services, beyond carbon 
storage, that are currently not 
being valued by world markets. The 
bundling of other ecosystem service 
payments in with carbon credits 
may not fully realize the potential 
future value of these services. Under 
REDD, forests emitting carbon 
dioxide are likely to attract higher 
payments than those that are not.
PINC addresses these shortcomings 
and suggests that payments can be 
sourced either from donor funds 
or patient capital attracted to the 
emerging new market in ‘Forest 
Bonds’ or ‘Ecosystem Service 
Trading Certificates’ which seek to 
value the services standing forests 
provide. REDD payments may 
transition to PINC as deforestation 
declines. PINC could also be applied 
to biodiversity outside forests.
Contact: 
m.trivedi@globalcanopy.org
REDD
Reducing 
emissions 
from forest 
carbon
CDM
Enhancing & 
restoring
forest Carbon
PINC
Maintaining
Ecosystem
Services - 
beyond Carbon
Figure 9. How PINC will interact with other UN mechanisms
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WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES?
Katia Karousakis, OECD
Much progress has been made since COP 11, when Papau New Guinea first 
proposed integrating REDD under the UNFCCC. This is illustrated by a 
general coalescence of REDD proposals submitted over time, the increasing 
number of REDD demonstration activities that are emerging, and the rising 
volume of funds that are being mobilized to support capacity-building or 
“readiness” for REDD.
A number of challenges to REDD implementation are still to be resolved to 
develop a REDD mechanism (whether fund or market-based) that is able 
to deliver environmentally-effective and economically-efficient emission 
reductions. The key challenges identified and highlighted here include:
 
 • Monitoring, reporting and verification for national 
 inventory purposes.
 
 • Capacity building and ensuring enabling policy environments,   
 including land tenure.
 
 • Minimising perverse incentives.
High quality national greenhouse gas inventories are the backbone of the 
international climate regime, and provide a means to monitor national 
progress with respect to international obligations. High quality data from 
the land use, land use change and forestry sector, which is consistent and 
comparable across developing countries, is therefore a critical requirement 
especially if REDD is to be integrated into the international carbon market. 
Historical trend data on deforestation are a key starting point, and need 
to be supplemented with data on emissions or changes in carbon stocks. 
Historical data are needed to establish baselines, the reference against which 
performance can be assessed. Data of this type therefore need to be made 
officially available as soon as possible. 
Building capacity for an effective REDD mechanism in developing and least 
developed countries is critical. This may include support for monitoring 
systems, institutional development, technical assistance and training and 
educational programmes.
In terms of achieving emission reductions, it is important to recall that 
deforestation and forest degradation are caused by a number of multiple 
drivers. That there are no existing incentives to capture and market the 
global public carbon services provided by forests is just one of these. Other 
drivers of deforestation include the lack of secure land tenure systems 
and clearly defined property rights, insufficient capacity for effective law-
enforcement, and agricultural and energy subsidies, amongst others. Though 
public funds can and should be mobilized and used to support capacity 
building in developing countries, the 2006 OECD Council Recommendation 
on Good Practices for Public Environment Expenditure Management states 
that “public funds cannot and should not substitute for weak environmental 
policies”. Concerted efforts will therefore also need to be made by developing 
country governments to address these. Similarly, governments around the 
world will need to redress policies with adverse implications for the forestry 
sector at the international scale, such as biofuels, agricultural and energy 
policies, amongst others. 
Though there are a number of other REDD issues that remain to be solved 
(including inter alia scope, leakage and permanence), appropriate features 
could be built into the design of a mechanism to address these (e.g. national 
baselines and insurance reserves). It is essential however that the basic 
building blocks for an effective REDD mechanism are put into place. These 
building blocks are the same whether REDD is fund or market-based and 
comprise clear goals and objectives; eligibility criteria (and prioritisation 
in the case of funds); sufficient and sustainable sources of financing; and 
monitoring and evaluation of performance over time d.
Finally, any new REDD mechanism will need to be flexible and to evolve 
as national circumstances across developing countries change over time. 
Actions on REDD should aim to work towards the long-term “shared 
vision” for climate change mitigation that is necessary to meet the ultimate 
objective of the Convention; to achieve the stabilisation of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
The ideas expressed in this section are those of the author and do not 
necessarily represent the views of the OECD, or its member countries.
* See Karousakis and Corfee-Morlot (2007) for further discussion14
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THE ROAD TO COPENHAGEN
POLITICAL MILESTONES
December 05
Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica table the first proposal to "stimulate 
action to reduce emissions from deforestation". This will go on to 
become REDD.
October 06
The Stern Review draws global attention to the financial impacts 
of climate change and the importance of curbing deforestation. 
October 07
The World Bank launches the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). 
December 07
The Bali Roadmap gives the world community 2 years to negotiate REDD 
in its final form. 
May 08
German Chancellor, Angela Merkel pledges €500 million per year, from the 
auctioning of emissions permits, to protect tropical forests and biodiversity.
June 08
The Congo Basin Forest Fund is set up to battle deforestation in central 
Africa. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Norwegian Prime Minister 
Jens Stoltenberg together pledge £108m. 
August 08
Brazil’s President Lula launches international ‘Forest Fund’ to raise $21 
billion by 2021. Norway pledges €1 billion to the fund through to 2015.
October 08
The Forests Dialogue issues guiding principles for including forests in 
climate change negotiations at the IUCN World Conservation Congress 
in Barcelona.
October 08
The Eliasch Review concludes that market-based mechanisms are essential 
to reach the levels of funding required to halt deforestation.
KEY STEPPING STONES TO 2012 / 13 
December 08
UNFCCC COP 14, Poznan: REDD-watchers hope for growing consensus 
and guidelines on early action during the countdown to Copenhagen.
December 08
EU Plenary: will the EU climate package pass, and what will be 
the outcome for forests?
June 09
Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technical Advice – 
Technical experts must begin to finalise a REDD architecture.
December 09
UNFCCC COP 15 Copenhagen – the framework for a Global Climate Deal 
including forests must be finalised, leaving time for ratification by 2012.
December 12
Kyoto II ratified and REDD begins to be funded as part of the international 
community’s new deal on climate change.
WHERE TO FIND OUT MORE
www.ForestsNow.org
This website is focused on forests and climate change, and on the countdown 
to the key UN climate meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009. It is 
a resource for the wider global community working to protect tropical 
forests.  Its main aim is to offer tools which facilitate communication and 
collaboration amongst that community.
At the site's heart is a political calendar: a timeline at the top of each page 
pulls out key milestones along the countdown to Copenhagen, while fully-
featured year, month, and week views provide information about relevant 
events around the world. Practical information is available for each event, 
and you can also share your own events with the community and call on 
colleagues to take specific actions.
UN Bali 2007 UN Poznan 2008 UN Copenhagen 2009
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Additionality
A programme of activity (PoA) is additional if it can be demonstrated that in the absence of 
the CDM (i) the proposed voluntary measure would not be implemented, or (ii) the mandatory 
policy/regulation would be systematically not enforced and that noncompliance with those 
requirements is widespread in the country/region, or (iii) that the PoA will lead to a greater 
level of enforcement of the existing mandatory policy /regulation. This shall constitute the 
demonstration of additionality of the PoA as a whole13.
Afforestation
Afforestation is the direct human-induced conversion of land that has not been forested for a 
period of at least 50 years to forested land through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced 
promotion of natural seed sources 13.
Carbon Pool
A system which has the capacity to accumulate or release carbon. Examples of carbon pools 
are forest biomass, wood products, soils, and atmosphere. The units are mass (e.g., t C)14.
Carbon Stock
The absolute quantity of carbon held within a pool at a specified time14.
Deforestation
Deforestation, as defined by the Marrakech Accords, is the direct human-induced conversion 
of forested land to non-forested land. A forest is defined as a minimum area of land of 0.05-1 
hectares with tree crown cover (or equivalent stocking level) of more than 10-30 percent with 
trees with the potential to reach a minimum height of 2-5 metres at maturity in situ. Actual 
definitions can vary from country to country as the Kyoto Protocol permits countries to specify 
the precise definition within these parameters to be used for national accounting of emissions. 
In contrast, deforestation as defined by the FAO is "the conversion of forest to another land use 
or the long-term reduction of the tree canopy cover below the minimum 10 percent threshold"15.
Degradation
A definition for forest degradation has not yet been agreed upon. Forest degradation is the 
depletion of forest to tree crown cover at a level above 10 percent, however beyond this general 
statement, the IPCC has not provided a specific definition15.
Fungible
Being of such a nature that one part or quantity may be replaced by another equal part or 
quantity in the satisfaction of an obligation. Oil, wheat, and lumber are fungible commodities. 
Throughout this book we refer to the fungibility of a tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e).
Hot Air
Hot air often refers to emissions reductions that are not additional16.
Leakage
Leakage is defined as the net change of anthropogenic emissions by sources of greenhouse gases 
(GHG) which occurs outside the project boundary, and which is measurable and attributable to 
the CDM project activity13.
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Permanence
The longevity of a carbon pool and the stability of its stocks, given the management and 
disturbance environment in which it occurs14.
Reforestation
Reforestation is the direct human-induced conversion of non-forested land to forested land 
through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources, 
on land that was forested but that has been converted to non-forested land. For the first 
commitment period, reforestation activities will be limited to reforestation occurring on those 
lands that did not contain forest on 31 December 198913.
Sequestration
The process of increasing the carbon content of a carbon pool other than the atmosphere13.
Sink
Any process or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol, or a precursor of a 
greenhouse gas from the atmosphere. A given pool (reservoir) can be a sink for atmospheric 
carbon if, during a given time interval, more carbon is flowing into it than is flowing out14.
Source
Opposite of sink: A carbon pool (reservoir) can be a source of carbon to 
the atmosphere if less carbon is flowing into it than is flowing out of it14.
SCOPE
DISTRIBUTION
KEY TO ICONS
SCALE
Degradation EnhancementDeforestation Historic
Emissions Direct Market
Current
Carbon Stock Hybrid / Market-linked
Projected
Opportunity 
Costs
Voluntary Fund
REFERENCE LEVEL
FINANCING
National Sub-national Global
118 119
The Little REDD Book will be constantly updated online in the run up 
to COP 15 in Copenhagen. To follow developments in research and the 
evolution of REDD proposals visit www.littleREDDbook.org
www.littleREDDbook.org
